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ASSESSING THE CLIMATE IMPACTS OF
U.S. TRADE AGREEMENTS
Matthew C. Porterfield,* Kevin P. Gallagher** &
Judith Claire Schachter***
ABSTRACT
Meeting the ambitious goals of the Paris Agreement will require the United
States and other major greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters to integrate climate
change considerations into all relevant areas of economic policy. The United
States, however, has conspicuously failed to do so with regard to international
trade negotiations. International trade agreements tend to increase GHG emissions due to the economic effects of trade liberalization, including increases in the
scale of economic activity and changes in the composition of the affected economies. Trade agreements can also affect climate change in less quantifiable but
potentially more significant ways by restricting the ability of governments to implement measures designed to mitigate climate change. Trade and investment
rules in U.S. trade agreements have already been invoked to challenge a number
of policies relevant to climate change, ranging from renewable energy programs to
the Obama administration’s decision to reject the Keystone XL pipeline.
Yet despite the growing evidence of the relevance of trade policy to climate
change, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) largely
ignores potential climate impacts when preparing environmental reviews of proposed trade agreements as required under Executive Order 13141. This Article
explores how the USTR could address climate change within the environmental
review process to both assess the potential economically driven and regulatory
impacts of proposed trade agreements for climate change and identify options for
mitigating those impacts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States and other signatories to the Paris Agreement have
committed “to reach[ing] global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as
soon as possible . . . and to undertak[ing] rapid reductions thereafter.”1 The
Paris Agreement indicates that this aggressive approach is necessary to
1.
Paris Agreement, in U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC],
Rep. of the Conference of the Parties on Its Twenty-First Session, at art. 4(1), U.N. Doc
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Paris Agreement], https://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf.
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achieve the goal of limiting the increase in average global temperatures to
“well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels. . . .”2
Meeting these targets will require the United States and other major
greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters to integrate climate change considerations
into all relevant areas of economic policy. The United States, however, has
conspicuously failed to do so with regard to international trade negotiations. International trade agreements tend to increase GHG emissions due
to the economic effects of trade liberalization, including increases in the
scale of economic activity and changes in the composition of the affected
economies.3 Recent analysis prepared for the European Commission, for
example, concludes that the proposed Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) between the United States and the European Union
(EU) would increase carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in the United States
by 0.3% and in the EU by 0.2%.4
In addition to economically induced impacts, trade agreements can also
affect climate change in less quantifiable but potentially more significant
ways by restricting the ability of governments to implement measures designed to mitigate climate change. Trade and investment rules in U.S.
trade agreements have already been invoked to challenge a number of policies relevant to climate change, ranging from renewable energy programs5
to the Obama administration’s decision to reject the Keystone XL pipeline.6
Yet despite the growing evidence of the relevance of trade policy to climate
change, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR)
2.
Id. at art. 2(1)(a). On June 1, 2017, President Trump announced his intention to
withdraw from the Agreement. See Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord
(June 1, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/06/01/statement-president
-trump-paris-climate-accord. Under Article 28 of the Agreement, the withdrawal could not
take place prior to June 4, 2020. See Brad Plumer, The U.S. Won’t Actually Leave the Paris
Climate Deal Anytime Soon, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/
07/climate/trump-paris-climate-timeline.html?_r=0. The Trump administration has subsequently equivocated regarding whether it will withdraw. See Joanna Walters, Top Trump
Officials Signal US Could Stay in Paris Climate Agreement, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 17, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/sep/17/trump-tillerson-mcmaster-paris-cli
mate-accord-stay-in.
3.
See WTO and U.N. Envtl. Program, Trade and Climate Change, at xii (2009) [hereinafter WTO-UNEP], https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/trade_climate_change
_e.pdf (“Most of the statistical studies [on trade liberalization and emissions] indicate that
more open trade will most likely lead to increased CO2 emissions . . .”).
4.
ECORYS, SIA in Support of the Negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) Final Report, at 24 (Mar. 2017) [hereinafter ECORYS], http://www.tradesia.com/ttip/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2014/02/TSIA-TTIP-Final-Report.pdf.
5.
See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
6.
The pipeline was subsequently approved by the Trump administration. See infra
note 102-04 and accompanying text.
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largely ignores potential climate impacts when preparing environmental reviews of proposed trade agreements.
Executive Order 13141 indicates that it is the policy of the United
States to “factor environmental considerations into the development of its
trade negotiating objectives.”7 The Executive Order requires the preparation of environmental reviews in order to (1) identify the potential environmental effects of proposed trade agreements and (2) evaluate options for
addressing those impacts.8 This Article explores how climate change could
be addressed within the environmental review process to fulfill the twin
goals of the Executive Order by both assessing the potential economically
driven and regulatory impacts of proposed trade agreements on climate
change and identifying options for mitigating those impacts.
Section II reviews the requirements of Executive Order 13141 and the
USTR’s failure to address climate change in its environmental reviews.
Section III identifies issues that should be examined and analytic approaches that could be used to assess the potential economic and policy
implications of proposed trade agreements. Section IV discusses options
for mitigating the adverse climate impacts of trade agreements that could be
evaluated in environmental reviews.

II. ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW OF TRADE AGREEMENTS UNDER
EXECUTIVE ORDER 13141
A. The Executive Order and Environmental Review Guidelines
Executive Order 13141, signed by President Clinton on November 16,
1999, directs the USTR to prepare environmental reviews on bilateral,
plurilateral, and multilateral trade agreements and “major new trade liberalization agreements in natural resource sectors.”9 Guidelines issued by the
USTR and the Council on Environmental Quality specify that an environmental review should address “all reasonably foreseeable environmental effects”10 of the proposed agreement, including both economically driven
7.
Exec. Order No. 13,141, 64 Fed. Reg. 63,169 (Nov. 18, 1999).
8.
Id. (“Environmental reviews are an important tool to help identify potential environmental effects of trade agreements, both positive and negative, and to help facilitate
consideration of appropriate responses to those effects whether in the course of negotiations,
through other means, or both.”).
9.
Id.
10.
See USTR AND COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 13141, ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW OF TRADE AGREEMENTS (2000), app. C, 17, [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW GUIDELINES], http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/guidelines
%20for%2013141.pdf.
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impacts11 and the implications for environmental regulations.12 In addition,
each review must include an analysis of options for mitigating negative
impacts.13
The Guidelines indicate that the analysis of economically driven impacts should focus on “the extent to which positive and negative environmental impacts may flow from economic changes estimated to result from
the trade agreement.”14 Relevant types of potential economic changes from
trade agreements that may cause environmental effects include changes in
volume and mode of transportation, changes in natural resource usage, and
“increased or decreased use of environmentally responsible technology.”15
Relevant regulatory effects that should be considered include “implications of the proposed trade agreement for U.S. environmental regulations,
statutes, and binding obligations such as multilateral environmental agreements . . . [and] for the ability of state, local and tribal authorities to regulate with respect to environmental matters” and implications for
“environmental policy instruments and other environmental commitments.”16 The regulatory impact assessment sections of the USTR’s environmental reviews, however, are typically brief and conclusory. The
regulatory analysis in the Interim Environmental Review of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), for example, is only a little over one page long.17
The Guidelines identify the following criteria for determining whether
global and transboundary environmental impacts should be addressed:
(a) scope and magnitude of reasonably foreseeable global and
transboundary impacts;
(b) implications for U.S. interests, including international commitments and programs for international cooperation;
(c) availability of relevant data and analytic tools for addressing
impacts outside the United States, including reviews performed by
11.
Id. § V(C).
12.
Id. § V(B).
13.
Id. § V(D).
14.
Id. § V(C).
15.
Id. app. C § II.
16.
Id. app. C. § I. A-B.
17.
See USTR, INTERIM ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW: TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT,
at 44-45 (2013), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP%20Interim%20Review%20-%20final%20for%20posting%20-%208.22.13.pdf. The Environmental Review of the TPP is unlikely to be finalized, given President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the agreement. See
Memorandum from Office of the Press Secretary Regarding Withdrawal of the United
States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement (Jan. 23, 2017) [hereinafter TPP Withdrawal Memorandum], https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/
01/23/presidential-memorandum-regarding-withdrawal-united-states-trans-pacific.
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other countries involved in negotiations or by regional or international organizations; and
(d) diplomatic considerations.18
The Guidelines specifically identify climate change and “impacts relating to environmental issues identified by the international community as
having a global dimension and warranting a global response” as among the
global and transboundary effects that may merit consideration.19

B. The USTR’s Failure to Consider Climate Impacts of
Trade Agreements
Despite the Environmental Review Guidelines’ explicit reference to climate change, the USTR does not address climate impacts in its environmental reviews of trade agreements. This omission appears to be due to
political considerations rather than any economic or regulatory analysis.
Climate change remains a highly divisive issue in Congress.20 Accordingly, the USTR has gone to significant lengths to avoid any linkages between trade and climate policy that might undermine support for pending
trade agreements, as evidenced by its efforts to delete references to climate
change from the TPP. In January 2014, a draft text of the TPP’s Environment Chapter was leaked.21 The text included an article on “Trade and Climate Change,” and stated that the Parties acknowledged “climate change as
a global concern that requires collective action” and recognized “the desirability that trade and climate change policies be mutually supportive.”22 The
article also noted the Parties’ commitments under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), as well as their
commitments to phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies.23
18.
ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW GUIDELINES, supra note 10, § IV(B)(5)(2).
19.
Id. app. C, § (IV)(G)(1), (3).
20.
The political sensitivity of climate policy is reflected in Section 914(b) of the Trade
Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, which instructs the USTR
[T]o ensure that trade agreements do not establish obligations for the United
States regarding greenhouse gas emissions measures, including obligations that
require changes to United States laws or regulations or that would affect the implementation of such laws or regulations, other than those fulfilling the other negotiating objectives in this section.
Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-125, § 914 (b)(3),
130 Stat. 122, 273 (2016).
21.
See Wikileaks, Secret Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP)—Environment Consolidated Text, (Jan. 15, 2014), https://wikileaks.org/tpp-enviro/#trade_and_climate.
22.
Id. art. SS.15, ¶¶ 1, 2.
23.
Id. art. SS.15, ¶¶ 1, 6.
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In February 2014, the United States responded to the leaked draft with
a counterproposal that changed the name of the article from “Trade and
Climate Change” to “Transition to a Low-Emissions Economy” and removed any references to climate change, the UNFCCC, or carbon.24 It also
deleted text indicating the Parties’ agreement to undertake “cooperative and
capacity building activities designed to facilitate effective implementation”
of commitments to phase out fossil fuel subsidies.25 The final text of the
TPP Environment Chapter released in October 2015 includes an article titled “Transition to a Low Emissions and Resilient Economy,” which contains no reference to climate change, the UNFCCC, or phasing out fossil
fuel subsidies.26
The political sensitivity of climate change, however, does not relieve
the USTR of its obligations under Executive Order 13141. As discussed
below, both economically driven and policy impacts of U.S. trade agreements on climate change are “reasonably foreseeable,”27 and failure to evaluate these impacts could significantly undermine the efforts of the United
States to collaborate with other countries on reducing global GHG emissions. Conversely, rigorous analysis in environmental reviews could reveal
opportunities to use trade agreements to mitigate climate change.

III. ASSESSING CLIMATE IMPACTS

OF

TRADE AGREEMENTS

A. Assessing Economically Driven Climate Impacts of
Trade Agreements
1. Four Economic Drivers of Climate Impacts
The economically driven climate impacts of trade agreements can be
defined as the impacts that reducing or eliminating tariff and non-tariff
measures (NTMs)28 have on GHG emissions and the social cost of those
24.
See Deborah Gleeson, Comparison of the Wikileaked Consolidated Text with the Most
Recent U.S. Proposal to Rewrite the Language in the Areas of Trade and Biodiversity and Trade and
Climate Change, REDGE, http://www.redge.org.pe/sites/default/files/20140218%20biodiversi
ty%20climate%20change%20TPP.pdf (last visited June 11, 2017).
25.
Compare id. and WikiLeaks, supra note 21, art. SS.15 and 6.
26.
See Trans-Pacific Partnership, Environment Chapter, art. 20.15, Feb. 4, 2016.
27.
See ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW GUIDELINES, supra note 10, app. C.
28.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) defines
non-tariff measures as “policy measures other than ordinary customs tariffs that can potentially have an economic effect on international trade in goods, changing quantities traded, or
prices or both.” U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., International Classification of Non-Tariff
Measures, at 1, UNCTAD/DITC/TAB/2012/2/Rev.1 (2012). NTMs cover a wider scope of
barriers than non-tariff barriers, which refer only to “restrictions that result from prohibitions, conditions or specific market requirements that make importation or exportation of
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emissions.29 The net economically driven climate impact of a particular
agreement may be positive or negative. That is, a trade agreement may
directly result in a net increase or decrease in GHG emissions and related
costs. The net impact will depend on the combined effect, within and
outside the United States, of several types of changes in economic activities
driven by reductions in barriers. There are four types of changes in economic activities or economic “effects”30 that primarily drive climate impacts: changes to the (a) scale, (b) composition, and (c) techniques of
production, and (d) changes to the volume and mode of transportation of
goods.

a. Scale
The scale effect refers to the increase in GHG emissions resulting from
the higher levels of economic activity associated with trade liberalization.31
If the carbon intensity of an economy does not change and the scale of the
economy grows, then the total level of GHG emissions must increase. The
scale effect is determined by multiplying carbon intensity by the amount of
products difficult and/or costly.” JACQUES PELKMANS, ET AL., THE IMPACT OF TTIP: THE UNDERLYING ECONOMIC MODEL AND COMPARISONS 19 n.37 (2014).
29.
The social cost of carbon (SCC) is a near-comprehensive estimate of economic
damages associated with an incremental increase in CO2 emissions, typically one metric ton,
in a given year. Conversely, an SCC figure can represent the value of damages avoided (or
benefit gained) from an incremental reduction in emissions. SCC values are already in use
by U.S. government agencies. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) considers
the SCC to be a useful indicator of the costs and benefits of CO2 reductions. See U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, Fact Sheet: Social Cost of Carbon, 1 (2015), http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/
Downloads/EPAactivities/social-cost-carbon.pdf. However, institutionalized use of SCC is
still in the early stages. See William Pizer et al., Using and Improving the Social Cost of Carbon,
346 SCIENCE 1189, 1189-90 (2014).
30.
The methodology of “decomposing” the impact of trade liberalization into “effects”
in order to assess its environmental impacts was developed by academics studying the environmental impacts of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the 1990s.
See Gene M. Grossman & Alan B. Krueger, Environmental Impacts of a North American Free
Trade Agreement, 1-3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3914, 1991); see
also, Brian R. Copeland & M. Scott Taylor, North-South Trade and the Environment, 109 Q. J.
ECON. 755 (1994); WTO-UNEP, supra note 3, at 49. Studies “decomposing” trade liberalization into the scale, composition, and technique effects in order to measure and/or project its
environmental impact have proliferated over the past few decades. Id. at 49-52. Few, however, have explored greenhouse-gas emissions specifically, and only a few of those have
looked at specific agreements rather than a cross-section. See Bárbara Cunha &
Muthukumara Mani, DR-CAFTA and the Environment (World Bank Latin Am. & Caribbean
Region Poverty Reduction and Econ. Mgmt. Unit, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5826,
2011). A very limited number of ex ante environmental reviews undertaken by the European
Commission refer to the scale-composition-technique framework. See discussion of the EU
approach, infra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
31.
WTO-UNEP, supra note 3, at 49.
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economic growth pre- and post-opening to trade.32 Given that most trade
agreements slightly increase economic growth, the scale effect tends to increase GHG emissions.33

b. Composition
The composition effect refers to how trade affects each trading partner’s
type and level of economic activity.34 When countries trade, they will specialize in producing those goods for which they are comparatively more
efficient, i.e., for which they have comparative advantage.35 If a country has
a comparative advantage in the factors of production (labor or capital) required for producing emissions-intensive goods, they will produce more of
those goods under conditions of liberalized trade.36 Conversely, if their
comparative advantage is in relatively less emissions-intensive goods, liberalized trade will promote increased production of those goods.37 Therefore,
trade liberalization’s composition effect can be associated with increasing or
decreasing emissions. Similar to the scale effect, the carbon intensity of
sectors does not change, but the mix of sectors can shift toward more or less
carbon intensive activity depending on the comparative advantages of the
parties to the agreement.
Regulations restricting emissions also affect comparative advantage.
The “pollution haven” hypothesis suggests that polluting production will
shift to countries where restrictions on pollution are relatively lax, i.e., to
those countries where the abundant factor is the ability to pollute.38 In the
climate context, this hypothesis is captured by the concept of “carbon leakage.” Carbon leakage refers to the situation where production transfers to
other countries with weaker constraints on GHG emissions for reasons of
costs, potentially leading to an increase in total emissions.39 The risk of
32.
See Grossman & Krueger, supra note 30.
33.
WTO-UNEP, supra note 3, at 50. The new, and therefore likely relatively less
emissions-intensive, capital that may be acquired in order to handle increased volumes of
economic activity is captured by the technique effect rather than the scale effect. Id. at 51.
The scale effect is also distinct from the rate of economic growth, which can be indirectly
impacted by trade through changes to the rates of technological innovation and capital accumulation. Id. at 50.
34.
Id.
35.
See id.
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
Kevin P. Gallagher, Economic Globalization and the Environment, 34 ANN. REV.
ENV’T. & RESOURCEs 279, 289-90 (2009).
39.
Youguo Zhang, Scale, Technique and Composition Effects in Trade-Related Carbon
Emissions in China, 51 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 371, 372 (2012); see also You Li & C.N.
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carbon leakage may be higher in certain energy-intensive and trade-sensitive industries.40

c. Technique
The technique effect refers to the effect of trade on technologies used
to produce goods and services.41 Whereas the scale and composition effects
hold carbon intensity constant, the technique effect accounts for forces that
reduce the carbon intensity of sectors in an economy through trade and
investment.42 International trade can increase the availability of environmentally friendly goods and services through the importation of technological innovations, particularly for countries that would otherwise lack access
to them.43 Increased trade can also incentivize the development of environmentally friendly goods and services for export by offering access to new
markets.44 In the climate change context, the technique effect is primarily
referenced in relation to this trade-driven diffusion of low-emission technologies.45 An income growth-driven technique effect has been identified
with respect to other types of environmental indicators. The Environmental
Kuznets Curve (EKC) theory posits that people increase their demand for a
clean environment as their incomes rise.46 The empirical evidence, however, does not support the existence of an EKC with respect to CO2
emissions.47
Hewitt, The Effect of Trade Between China and the UK on National and Global Carbon Dioxide
Emissions, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 1907, 1907-08 (2008).
40.
See European Commission, Carbon Leakage, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/
cap/leakage/index_en.htm (last visited June 11, 2017).
41.
WTO-UNEP, supra note 3, at 51.
42.
Id. at 50-51.
43.
Id. at 51.
44.
See WTO, The Impact of Trade Opening on Climate Change, https://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/envir_e/climate_impact_e.htm (last visited June 11, 2017). This aspect of
the technique effect provides a rationale for current plurilateral negotiations to reduce barriers to trade in environmental goods and services. See USTR, UNITED STATES AND WTO PARTNERS ANNOUNCE L AUNCH OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS AGREEMENT (July 2014),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2014/July/US-and-WTOPartners-Announce-Launch-of-Negotiations-for-Enviro-Goods-Agreement.
45.
WTO-UNEP, supra note 3, at 51.
46.
WTO-UNEP, supra note 3, at 51-52. The EKC has been widely explored in the
trade and development context. See, e.g., David I. Stern, The Rise and Fall of the Environmental Kuznets Curve, 32 WORLD DEV. 1419, 1419 (2004).
47.
WTO-UNEP, supra note 3, at 54. See also Jeffrey A. Frankel & Andrew K. Rose, Is
Trade Good or Bad for the Environment? Sorting Out the Causality, 87 REV. ECON. STAT. 85, 88
(2005) (noting that CO2 is a global externality unlikely to be addressed at the national level).
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d. Transportation
Trade relies on the transportation of goods. Liberalizing international
trade is likely to increase demand for transportation services.48 The transport effect, therefore, tends to increase emissions.49 The transport effect is a
significant component of overall economic effects. A 2013 study found that
international freight transport in 2004 generated 1.205 billion tons of CO2equivalent emissions,50 which represents a third of all trade-related
emissions.51
More than one mode of transportation is often involved in moving a
good from a producer in one country to the ultimate consumer in another.
The climate impacts of each mode must be calculated because of differences
in the types and volumes of associated GHG emissions. For example,
container ships are particularly CO2-emission intensive.52 From 2007–2012,
shipping accounted for approximately 3.1% of annual global anthropogenic
CO2 emissions and approximately 2.8% of annual GHGs on a carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) basis on average.53 A multi-year average estimate for
international shipping for the 2007–2012 period is 846 million tons of CO2
and 866 million tons of CO2e.54 International shipping emissions for 2012
were estimated to be 796 million tons CO2 and 816 million tons CO2e for
GHGs (CO2, CH4, and N2O).55 Maritime CO2 emissions are projected to
increase significantly in the next few decades, with some studies projecting
growth of up to 250% by 2050.56 Methane emissions are predicted to increase rapidly as the amount of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the fuel mix
increases.57
Airlines transported 51.3 million metric tons of goods in 2014, representing more than 35% of global trade by value or $18.6 billion worth of
48.
WTO-UNEP, supra note 3, at 58.
49.
Id. at 53, 59-60.
50.
Anca Cristea et al., Trade and the Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Freight
Transport, 65 J. ENVTL. & ECON. MGMT. 153, 161 (2013). The authors also found that
“[t]ransport emissions will grow faster than trade by value and faster than output emissions,
with especially rapid growth in maritime emissions.” Id. at 155.
51.
Id. at 154.
52.
See James J. Corbett et al., The Effectiveness and Costs of Speed Reductions on Emissions
from International Shipping, 14 TRANSP. & ENV’T 593, 593 (2009).
53.
IMO, Third IMO GHG Study 2014: Key Findings, tbl.1(a)-(b), http://www.imo.
org/en/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/AirPollution/Pages/Greenhouse-GasStudies-2014.aspx (last visited June 11, 2017).
54.
Id. ¶ 1.1.
55.
Id.
56.
Id. ¶ 5.1.
57.
Id. ¶ 5.4.
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goods daily.58 Except for diesel motor vehicles, airplanes are the most pollution-intensive mode of transportation.59 A landmark 1999 IPCC Report
on aviation emissions found that aviation accounted for 13% of all transportation-related emissions.60
Land-based modes (trucking, rail, and pipelines) move large volumes of
goods in international trade, particularly among trading partners that share
a land border, and were responsible for 10.2% of global trade by volume in
2006.61 Truck-idling has also been found to contribute significantly to
trade-related GHG emissions.62

2. “Best Practice” for Assessing Economically Driven
Climate Impacts? The EU Approach
In contrast to the United States’ current approach under Executive Order 13141, several U.S. trading partners, most notably the EU, do assess
economically driven climate impacts as part of their review processes for
trade and investment agreements.63 The European Commission conducts
Sustainability Impact Assessments (SIAs) of potential trade agreements
that prioritize climate change among potential environmental impacts.64
The Final SIA on the TTIP estimates that it would increase CO2 emissions
in the EU by 0.2%, with a social cost of carbon (SCC) of up to 91 million
Euros.65 In the United States, the Final SIA projects that CO2 emissions
58.
Air Cargo, Int’l Air Transp. Ass’n (IATA), https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/cargo/
Pages/index.aspx (last visited June 11, 2017).
59.
WTO-UNEP, supra note 3, at 60.
60.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Aviation and the Global Atmosphere, at 6 (1999), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/spm/av-en.pdf. Accounting
for the climate impacts of increased aviation trade specifically is important because of how
aviation emissions contribute to radiative forcing. Radiative forcing refers to how GHG
emissions can impact cloud and ozone formation, which affects how much heat remains
within the earth’s atmosphere. Id. at 3, 3 n.4. The IPCC report estimated that aviation
emissions were responsible for 3.5% of the total anthropogenic radiative forcing in 1992 and
projected an increase to 5% for a mid-range emission scenario by 2050. Id. at 8.
61.
WTO-UNEP, supra note 3, at 58-59.
62.
ICF CONSULTING, NORTH AMERICAN TRADE AND TRANSPORTATION CORRIDORS: ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES: FINAL REPORT 49 (2001).
63.
See, e.g., Glob. Affairs Can., Environmental Assessments (EAs) of Trade Negotiations,
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/env/facts.aspx?lang=
EN&_ga=2.5613105.380424230.1495224426-961220658.1495224424 (last updated Jan. 06,
2015).
64.
See, e.g., LSE ENTERPRISE LTD, TRADE SUSTAINABILITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF THE COM PREHENSIVE TRADE AND INVESTMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND JAPAN, FINAL
INCEPTION REPORT 26 (2015) (“The overall analysis will lay a focus on the following environmental topics: climate change (GHG emissions); energy use; resource use and efficiency;
ecosystems and biodiversity.”).
65.
See ECORYS, supra note 4, at 24, 202 tbl.5.7.
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would increase by 0.3%, with an SCC of up to 84.4 million Euros.66 The
increased emissions would result from growth in the scale of economic activity, technique effects, and changes in the composition of industries and
trading partners.67 The largest increase in emissions would be in China due
to the relocation of some production to that country that is projected to
result from the treaty.68
The EU’s methodology involves two primary steps. First, data is collected regarding the proposed trade agreement and used to model the economic effects of trade using a type of multi-sector, multi-region computergenerated equilibrium (CGE) model.69 Second, the outputs of this modeling are inputted into the E3ME econometric model, which has fewer assumptions than standard CGE models.70 This second model is designed to
estimate (1) changes in energy consumption by user group and fuel, (2)
CO2 emissions of most energy-intensive sectors and primary energy producing sectors, (3) changes in other GHG emissions, and (4) costs of GHG
and air pollutants to human health and biodiversity.71

3. Adapting the U.S. Environmental Review Process:
Building on the EU Approach
Incorporating a similar two-step, two-model methodology would be an
improvement on the existing U.S. environmental review process because it
would ensure that estimates of trade-driven GHG emissions are generated
66.
Id.
67.
See id. at 199.
68.
See Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research (CEPR), Reducing Transatlantic Barriers to Trade
and Investment, An Economic Assessment 79 tbl.39 (2013), http://www.trade-sia.com/ttip/wpcontent/uploads/sites/6/2014/02/CEPR-Reducing-Transatlantic-Barriers-to-Trade-and-In
vestment-An-Economic-Assessment.pdf.
69.
CGE models operate by isolating the effect of a change in trade policy and comparing the economic performance of each party to the agreement pre- and post-implementation
of the policy. CGE models are capable of capturing the simultaneous impact of liberalization
of tariff and some non-tariff barriers. See Badri Narayanan G. et al., Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., Quantifying the Mega-regional Trade Agreements: A Review of the Models, at 5-6, 18
(2015). The CGE model used to project the impacts of TTIP and relied upon by the European Commission accounts for non-tariff barriers and “allows for trade to impact on capital
stocks through investment effects.” See European Comm’n, Main Aspects of the CGE Model,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/march/tradoc_150762.pdf (last visited June 11,
2017).
70.
See ECORYS, Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment on the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP) Between the European Union and the United States of America—
Final Inception Report, at 34, Trade/2013/E1/E03 (2014) [hereinafter ECORYS Sustainability], http://www.trade-sia.com/ttip/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2014/06/TSIA-TTIP
-Final-Inception-Report-publish2506.pdf.
71.
Id. at 35.
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and made publicly available for review and comment. However, incorporating model-based quantitative assessment alone will not sufficiently adapt
the U.S. environmental review process to assess economically driven climate impacts for at least three reasons.
First, CGE models typically focus on estimating changes that result
from the reduction or removal of tariff barriers.72 Consequently, when applied to trade agreements between trading partners that have already lowered tariffs for many sectors (such as the United States and the EU), only
relatively small economic changes may be predicted to occur in the aggregate. Using those predictions to estimate climate impacts is therefore likely
to lead to relatively small projected changes in GHG emissions and mask
potentially significant geographic and sector specific impacts.73 CGEdriven assessments focus on aggregate impact and thus can fail to adequately address significant local or sector-specific impacts, thereby preempting any analysis of alternative negotiating scenarios and/or mitigation
options.74
Second, CGE models that incorporate NTMs may further skew estimates of potential climate impacts because they lack the theoretical rigor
that tariff liberalization enjoys. For example, some of the models used to
assess the economic impact of TTIP include environmental and health-related NTMs among potentially “actionable” measures,75 i.e., measures
72.
See KEVIN GALLAGHER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEWS OF TRADE AGREEMENTS: ASSESSING
NORTH AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 7 (2001), http://www3.cec.org/islandora/fr/item/1762-envi
ronmental-reviews-trade-agreements-assessing-north-american-experience-en.pdf.
73.
See id. at 16-17.
74.
See id. at 14-15. Past U.S. environmental reviews predicted no significant environmental impact based on low projected economic impacts; a similar inference is likely with
regard to GHG emissions absent adjustments to the USTR’s approach. See, e.g., USTR,
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW UNITED STATES—KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT at I (Sept. 2011),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/Countries%20Regions/africa/agreements/pdfs/FT
As/KOREA%20Final%20Environmental%20Review.pdf (finding that the Korea Free Trade
Agreement will have no significant effects on the U.S. environment because it will not have
significant impact on U.S. goods production).
Average tariffs applied by the U.S. on EU imports and by the EU on U.S. imports are
less than 3%. See LIONEL FONTAGN ET AL., CEPII, TRANSATLANTIC TRADE: WHITHER PARTNERSHIP,
WHICH ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES? 1 (2013). For TTIP, predicted one-time GDP increases are
small, ranging from 0.1-0.5%. See Jeronim Capaldo, The Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership: European Disintegration, Unemployment and Instability 9 (Glob. Dev. & Env’t Inst.,
Working Paper No. 14-03, 2014).
75.
See ECORYS, Non-Tariff Measures in EU-US Trade and Investment – An Economic
Analysis xxv-xxxii (2009), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/december/tradoc_1456
13.pdf. This report, which was commissioned and financed by the European Commission in
the lead up to the TTIP negotiations, includes the U.S. Clean Air Act among divergent nontariff measures important to U.S.-EU trade that if targeted for convergence, could lead to
economic gains. Id. at 135, 154-55.
THE

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\7-1\MEA102.txt

Fall 2017]

unknown

Seq: 15

Assessing the Climate Impacts of U.S. Trade Agreements

16-MAR-18

7:21

65

whose costs could be reduced by a certain percentage under TTIP.76 Yet
certain health or environmental policies that are seen as NTMs may be
economically efficient instruments to incorporate negative externalities into
production and consumption decisions. In such cases, a CGE model may
inappropriately deem the elimination of such regulation as welfare enhancing, unless the avoided social costs are also incorporated into the model.
Third, although some climate change-sensitive, NTMs may be appropriate for quantitative assessment, they will have follow-on effects that necessitate in-depth qualitative analysis. For example, the European
Commission’s (EC) proposed draft Energy Chapter for the TTIP would
require the United States to eliminate all restrictions on exports of natural
gas to the EU.77 The EU is heavily dependent on imports to supply its
needs for crude oil and natural gas, which are the EU’s two most important
energy sources, and it is eager to reduce its reliance on Russian energy
imports.78 Under the terms of the EC’s proposed Energy Chapter, the
United States would likely extract and refine more gas and export more
LNG to the EU than without the TTIP. Any attempt by the USTR to
quantify the extent to which LNG exports may increase due to proposed
expedited licensing for U.S. exports would also need to assess the extent to
which increased exports will incentivize emissions-intensive exploration and
production methods, such as hydraulic fracturing, and any climate impacts
specific to those methods, such as fugitive methane emissions.79 Incorporating this type of qualitative analysis would significantly improve the
USTR’s current approach.80
76.
According to the Ecorys study, approximately 50% of NTMs can be eliminated. Id.
at xiii.
77.
See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
78.
See KEITH J. BENES, CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE TREATMENT OF ENERGY IN THE US–EU
TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP 5 (2015). Europe currently imports 53% of
its demand for energy, 88% of which is for crude oil, 66% of which is for LNG. Id. at 7-8.
79.
Jennifer Morgan & James Bradbury, What Exporting U.S. Natural Gas Means for the
Climate, WORLD RESOURCES INST. BLOG (May 20, 2013), http://www.wri.org/blog/2013/05/whatexporting-us-natural-gas-means-climate.
80.
See USTR, INTERIM ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT
35 (2013), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP%20Interim%20Review%20-%20final
%20for%20posting%20-%208.22.13.pdf (concluding that “the risk of environmental damage
due to increased domestic LNG production driven by TPP trade appears to be low.”). The
USTR’s analysis of LNG exports in the TPP Interim Review was limited and did not mention emissions. The USTR concluded that the “risk of environmental damage due to increased domestic LNG production driven by TPP trade appears to be low.” It based its
conclusion on the fact that, since other TPP countries are increasing their LNG exports and
the TPP will liberalize trade between those countries as well, U.S. exports will have to
compete for market share, and therefore TPP is unlikely to drive substantial increased production. Additionally, the review notes that the TPP will not change any existing U.S.
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In sum, the EU’s approach can provide a starting point for assessing
economically driven climate impacts as part of the existing U.S. environmental review process. U.S. environmental reviews should generate estimates of the scale, composition, technique, and transportation drivers81 and
publish their combined predicted effect on GHG emissions for the U.S and
globally.82 Also, they should calculate the social cost or savings of any net
emissions increase or decrease, and combine quantitative assessment with
qualitative analysis of emissions-sensitive sectors.

B. Impacts on Climate Policies
In addition to producing economically driven effects on climate change,
trade agreements can also affect the development and implementation of
both existing and proposed climate policies. Because of the apparently political decision to avoid references to climate change in the context of trade
negotiations,83 U.S. environmental reviews under Executive Order 13141
have not discussed the potential effects of trade and investment rules on
climate policies. Although the USTR has not explained the basis for this
omission, proponents of the current trade model have generally rejected
claims that trade agreements can undermine domestic regulatory authority.
The discussion has been framed in various ways, including whether
trade and investment rules have a “chilling effect” on regulatory policy or
provide adequate “policy space” to accommodate governments’ “right to regulate.” Embedded within this debate are two distinct issues: (1) the potential for conflict between trade and investment rules and climate policies, and
(2) the legal and political effects of any such conflict on the implementation
and enforcement of those policies. As discussed below, evaluation of each
environmental laws regulating LNG production and that granting automatic licenses for export to TPP countries will only add six countries, most of which are not significant LNG
importers.
81.
The USTR has not made parameters or outputs of any modeling of environmental
impacts that has been done as part of environmental reviews to date publically available, but
there is evidence that it has, at minimum, seriously explored the use of economic models in
environmental reviews. See USTR, REPORT OF THE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS WORKING GROUP TO
THE INTERAGENCY ENVIRONMENT GROUP 2 (2000), https://ustr.gov/archive/assets/Document_Library/Federal_Register_Notices/2000/November/asset_upload_file597_2449.pdf. Moreover,
the scale, composition, technique, and transportation drivers are already listed in the Environmental Review Guidelines for possible inclusion in the ER. See ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW
GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at app. C, § II.
82.
This is the approach taken by the European Commission in its preliminary assessment of the TTIP, which calculated estimated changes in GHG emissions for the EU, the
United States, and globally. See CEPR, supra note 68, at 4.
83.
See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text (discussing exclusion of references to
climate change in the TPP).
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of these issues supports the need for a detailed assessment to ensure the
consistency of proposed trade agreements with climate objectives. A wide
variety of climate-related policies are either already being challenged or are
potential targets under trade and investment rules, and there are various
legal and political mechanisms through which such challenges could affect
those policies.

1. The Potential for Conflict Between Trade Rules and
Climate Policies
The trade and investment rules that could conflict with climate policies
can be divided into two categories: rules that specifically focus on restricting regulation of the energy sector and broader limitations on regulatory
authority that can be used to challenge climate policies.

a. Specific Rules Targeting the Energy Sector
The most obvious sources of potential conflict with climate measures
are trade rules that specifically target climate and energy policies. For example, the EU’s proposals concerning energy trade in the TTIP negotiations include numerous provisions that could undermine climate objectives.
Specifically, the EU has proposed restrictions on laws that require the use
of local goods or services as a condition of eligibility for programs that
promote renewable energy.84 Such local content requirements (LCRs) are
widely used at the state level in the United States to build support for
renewable energy programs.85
Even renewable energy programs without LCRs could be subject to
challenge under language the EU is proposing that would prohibit the
TTIP’s Parties from discriminating between different types of energy with
regard to access the energy transmission systems.86 This provision could be
84.
EU – US Trade and Investment Partnership, Raw Materials and Energy, Initial EU
Position Paper, at 3, COM (July 2008), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/july/tradoc
_151624.pdf (“[A] confirmation of prohibition of local content requirements for [renewable
energy] goods, services and investments could be introduced [in the TTIP]. Commitments
related to subsidies contingent on local content requirements . . . could also be included.”).
85.
See Timothy Meyer, How Local Discrimination Can Promote Global Public Goods, 95
B.U. L. REV. 1939, 1959 (2015) (“Twenty-three states within the United States collectively
have forty-four programs with renewable energy LCRs.”); see also id. at 1984-88 (arguing
that LCRs provide necessary incentives for the adaptation of renewable energy programs
that produce global public goods).
86.
See Directorate-General for Trade, TTIP: EU’s Proposal for a Chapter on Energy and
Raw Materials in TTIP, art. e 4(1), TRADE 53/2016 (June 20, 2016) [hereinafter DirectorateGeneral], https://www.scribd.com/document/317950734/Tafta-La-proposition-de-Bruxellesen-matiere-d-energie-et-matieres-premieres (“Each Party shall ensure that operators of transmission systems in its territory grant access to their systems to entities of the other Party for
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used to challenge feed-in tariff (FIT) policies that provide incentives, including preferential rates and long-term contracts, for producing and supplying renewable energy to the grid.87 The EU has also proposed language
in the TTIP that could limit the ability of the United States to restrict the
construction of oil and gas pipelines. The EU’s proposed Chapter on Energy and Raw Materials would incorporate GATT Article V—which provides for freedom of transit for goods across the territory of WTO
Members88—and includes language indicating that “the Parties recognize
that Article V of GATT 1994 includes the movement of energy goods via
pipelines or electricity grids.”89 This language could potentially be used to
challenge measures like the Obama administration’s rejection of the proposed Keystone XL Pipeline.90 The U.S. State Department indicated that
it denied the permit for the pipeline—which would transport high carbonintensity tar sands oil from Alberta, Canada to refineries in the United
States—largely due to concerns that approving the project would undermine
the United States’ efforts to coordinate with other nations in addressing
climate change.91
The EU’s proposed Energy Chapter also states that “the Parties must
agree on a legally binding commitment to eliminate all existing restrictions
on the export of natural gas in trade between them. . . .”92 Although natural
gas is generally less carbon intensive than oil or coal, increased exports of
LNG from the United States under TTIP could actually increase net GHG
the transport of gas and electricity. Such access shall be granted on commercial terms that
are . . . non-discriminatory (including as between types of energy) . . .”).
87.
See generally U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN ., FEED-IN TARIFF: A POLICY TOOL ENCOURAGING
DEPLOYMENT OF RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY TECHNOLOGIES (May 30, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/to
dayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=11471#.
88.
Directorate-General, supra note 86, at art. XX.
89.
See id. art. 3.
90.
See DANAE AZARIA, TREATIES ON TRANSIT OF ENERGY VIA PIPELINES AND COUNTERMEASURES 63 n.31 (2015) (“[I]t could be argued that GATT Article V may entail the obligation to
negotiate in good faith the construction of new pipelines . . . .”).
91.
See U.S. DEP ’T OF STATE, RECORD OF DECISION AND NATIONAL INTEREST DETERMINATION,
TRANSCANADA KEYSTONE PIPELINE, L.P. APPLICATION FOR PRESIDENTIAL PERMIT § 6.3 (Nov. 3
2015), https://keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/documents/organization/249450.pdf; see also infra note 128 and accompanying text. TransCanada resubmitted its application in response to
a Memorandum issued by President Trump that directed the relevant federal agencies to
expedite review of the application and approve it “as warranted.” See Memorandum from
Office of the Press Secretary on Construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline (January 24,
2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/24/presidential-memorandumregarding-construction-keystone-xl-pipeline. On May 24, 2017, the State Department approved the permit. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of the Spokesman, Issuance
of Presidential Permit to TransCanada for Keystone Xl Pipeline (March 24, 2017), https://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/03/269074.htm.
92.
See Directorate-General, supra note 86.
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emissions due to a variety of factors. Increased LNG exports could encourage expanded production of natural gas in the United States, which
could result in increased releases of methane, a much more powerful GHG
than carbon dioxide.93 In addition, the process of liquefaction, transportation, and regasification of natural gas is extremely energy intensive, making
exported natural gas significantly more carbon intensive than gas used
domestically.94

b. Conflicts under Broad Trade and Investment Rules
In addition to rules specifically addressing regulation of the energy sector, climate policies could also be affected by rules contained in trade and
investment agreements that apply more broadly to regulatory measures.
Restrictions on tariffs, for example, could make it more difficult to implement carbon pricing in the form of either carbon taxes or emissions trading
programs. The International Energy Agency has concluded that
carbon pricing will be needed as a feature of the national and international policy response [to climate change]. . .to reach across the
whole of the economy (and particularly to influence private investors) there is no substitute for correct energy pricing, including the
creation of expectations of a rising trend in carbon prices.95
Taxes applied to impose carbon pricing on imported products (“border
tax adjustments” or BTAs) are an important element of such programs,
preventing the “leakage” of the avoided GHG emissions to offshore manufacturers.96 BTAs, however, may violate tariff bindings if they are determined to be import charges rather than internal taxes applied at the
border.97
The broad nondiscrimination standards that are a central element of
trade agreements could also be used to undermine climate policies. Even in
the absence of specific restrictions on local content requirements, such as
those that the EU is attempting to secure in the TTIP, nondiscrimination
rules under the WTO’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
and Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) have al93.
See Morgan & Bradbury, supra note 79.
94.
Id.
95.
Int’l Energy Agency, Energy & Climate Change: World Energy Outlook Special Report,
135 (2015), https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WEO2015Special
ReportonEnergyandClimateChange.pdf.
96.
See Joel P. Trachtman, WTO Law Constraints on Border Tax Adjustment and Tax
Credit to Reduce the Competitive Effects of Carbon Taxes 21 (2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2738752.
97.
Id. at 6-17.
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ready been used to successfully challenge LCRs in renewable energy programs.98 Any climate policy that differentiates between products or
services based on their climate impacts could be similarly challenged as impermissibly discriminatory.99
Investment rules contained in trade agreements arguably present an
even greater potential for conflict with climate policies.100 Investment disputes can be initiated by foreign investors through a process known as “investor-state dispute settlement” (ISDS), unlike trade disputes, which can
only be brought by governments.101 Moreover, investment rules generally
apply to any measure of a Party that affects a covered investment of another
Party’s investor. Accordingly, investment rules can be used by fossil fuel
companies to challenge a wide variety of climate measures.
For example, TransCanada, the Canadian corporation whose permit for
the construction of the Keystone XL pipeline was initially rejected by the
Obama administration based on concerns about the implications for climate
policy,102 brought a claim under NAFTA’s investment chapter seeking $15

98.
See WTO Panel Report, India—Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar
Modules, WT/DS456/R (Feb. 24, 2016) (domestic content requirements in Indian solar
power program held to violate Article 2.1 of TRIMs Agreement and Article III:4 of GATT);
see also Appellate Body Report, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy
Generation Sector and Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program, WT/DS412/
AB/R and WT/DS426/AB/R (May 6, 2013) (domestic content requirement in Ontario’s
feed-in tariff program for renewable energy held to violate Article 2.1 of TRIMs Agreement
and Article III:4 of GATT). Similar challenges are pending against other renewable energy
programs containing LCRs. See generally Meyer, supra note 85, at 1949-50.
99.
See Christian Häberli, WTO Rules Can Prevent Climate Change Mitigation for Agriculture 2 (Soc’y of Int’l Econ. L. (SIEL), Fifth Biennial Global Conference, Working Paper No.
2016/06, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2800011
(“[D]iscrimination follows differentiation. It is implicit in all subsidies and other incentives
offered exclusively to climate-friendly investments and operations. It may also appear in
border measures compensating disadvantages for domestic producers resulting from carbon
emission limitations, or of prohibitions of certain energy sources.”).
100.
See generally Gus Van Harten, Foreign Investor Protection and Climate Action: A New
Price Tag for Urgent Policies 1 (Osgoode Legal Stud. Research Paper No. 21/2016, 2015), http:/
/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2697555.
101.
Compare, for example, the procedures under the United States-Korea Free Trade
Agreement governing the settlement of trade disputes in Chapter 22, Section B, (Free Trade
Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, S. Kor.-U.S.,
Ch. 22 § B, Mar. 10, 2012, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/korus/
asset_upload_file973_12721.pdf), with the provisions for investment disputes in Chapter 11,
Section B, Free Trade Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of
Korea, S. Kor.-U.S., Ch. 11 § B, March 10, 2012, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/
agreements/fta/korus/asset_upload_file587_12710.pdf).
102.
See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
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billion in damages.103 TransCanada only withdrew the claim after the
Trump Administration approved construction of the pipeline.104 Investment chapters in new free trade agreements could significantly expand the
access of fossil fuel companies to ISDS, potentially resulting in numerous
similar claims challenging climate measures.105
One standard of investor protection that could be a source of tension
with climate policies is the right to fair and equitable treatment (FET),
which has been interpreted to include protection from changes in regulatory
standards that interfere with investors’ “legitimate expectations” about their
investments.106 Achieving the dramatic reduction in GHG emissions that
will be necessary to stay below the 2°C threshold107 will require significant
changes in current government energy policies beyond the commitments
made in Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) under
the Paris Agreement. The United Nations Environmental Program
(UNEP) has estimated that full implementation of INDCs would only limit
average temperature increase by the end of the century to <3-3.5°C.108
103.
See Request for Arbitration (ICSID) at 39, TransCanada Corp. v. United States,
(2016), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7407.pdf.
104.
Approval of Keystone XL’s Presidential Permit Ends NAFTA Claim, INSIDE U.S. TRADE
DAILY REP . (Mar. 24, 2017), https://0-insidetrade.com.gull.georgetown.edu/trade/approvalkeystone-xls-presidential-permit-ends-nafta-claim.
105.
See BEN BEACHY, CLIMATE ROADBLOCKS: L OOMING TRADE DEALS THREATEN EFFORTS TO
KEEP FOSSIL FUELS IN THE GROUND 6 (Mar. 2016), http://www.sierraclub.org/sites/www.sierra
club.org/files/uploads-wysiwig/climate-roadblocks.pdf (“The two deals [TPP and TTIP]
would newly grant ISDS rights to more than 100 foreign fossil fuel corporations that own
more than 1,000 U.S. subsidiaries—more than the total number of fossil fuel firms that have
such rights under all 56 existing U.S. trade and investment pacts combined.”). Although
President Trump has withdrawn from the TPP, he has indicated that United States will
continue to pursue bilateral FTAs. TPP Withdrawal Memorandum, supra note 17.
106.
U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Fair and Equitable Treatment: UNCTAD Series
on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, at 63, UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/5 (2012),
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf (“Protection of investors’ legitimate
expectations has been repeatedly identified by arbitral tribunals as a key element of the FET
standard.”). See also Matthew C. Porterfield, State Practice and the (Purported) Obligation
under Customary International Law to Provide Compensation for Regulatory Expropriations, 37
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM . REG. 159, 166-71 (2011) (discussing interpretation of FET to include
a right to a stable regulatory environment that does not frustrate investors’ “legitimate
expectations”).
107.
See Paris Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2(1)(a).
108.
See UNEP, The Emissions GAP Report 2015, at xviii, (2015), http://uneplive.unep.
org/media/docs/theme/13/EGR_2015_301115_lores.pdf. The International Energy Agency
has a slightly more optimistic assessment. Int’l Energy Agency, supra note 95, at 4, (“Pledges
for COP21 will have a positive impact on future energy sector trends, but fall short of the
major course correction required to achieve the agreed climate goal. If climate ambition is
not raised progressively, it is estimated that the path set by the INDCs would be consistent

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\7-1\MEA102.txt

72

unknown

Seq: 22

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

16-MAR-18

7:21

[Vol. 7:1

Protection for investors’ expectations about existing investments tends
to limit the ability of governments to modify regulatory standards. Keeping
below a 2°C increase, in contrast, will require significant government interventions that will disrupt the energy sector and shift production from fossil
fuels to renewable sources. Accordingly, a right to regulatory stability
threatens to undermine the regulatory flexibility that will be necessary to
address climate change.109

2. The Relationship between International Trade and
Investment Rules and Climate Policies
Despite the numerous examples of trade and investment rules being
used to challenge climate measures, concerns over the potential conflicts
with domestic regulatory standards have been rejected as unfounded on the
grounds that the international adjudication and enforcement systems for
trade and investment rules do not have the capacity to directly modify domestic law.110 As discussed below, this argument ignores the variety of
ways—both legal and political—in which the provisions of international
trade agreements can affect domestic policies, including climate measures.
The principal remedy for a violation of a trade rule is the authorization
of the “suspension of concessions” (i.e. the imposition of trade sanctions) by
the complaining country.111 The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body does not
have the authority to compel the substantive modification or suspension of
the offending measure. Similarly, a claimant in an investor-state dispute
may seek restitution of property or the award of monetary damages112 but
with an average global temperature increase of around 2.7 degrees Celsius (°C) by 2100,
falling short of limiting the increase to no more than 2°C.”).
109.
See Van Harten, supra note 100, at 1 (“[N]ot all forms of investment are compatible
with a stable climate. ISDS puts a priority on foreign investment protection that skews the
playing field in favour of larger incumbents in the resource sector at the expense of domestic
investors and smaller players in alternative energy.”).
110.
See, e.g., Jeffrey Zients, Director of the National Economic Council and Assistant
to the President for Economic Policy, Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Questions and
Answers (Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/02/26/investor-state-dispute
-settlement-isds-questions-and-answers (“[T]he reality is that ISDS does not and cannot require countries to change any law or regulation.”).
111.
See, e.g., Understanding the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
art. 22, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, [hereinafter DSU], https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_
e/28-dsu.pdf.
112.
See, e.g., U.S. DEP ’T OF STATE, 2012 MODEL U.S. BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, art.
34(1), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf (last visited May 13, 2017)
(“Where a tribunal makes a final award against a respondent, the tribunal may award, separately or in combination, only: (a) monetary damages and any applicable interest; and (b)
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not injunctive or declaratory relief, such as an order for the government to
cease enforcing a law against the investor.113
Yet despite the limited remedial authority of international dispute settlement mechanisms, trade and investment rules can result in the modification of domestic law, including domestic climate regulations. As discussed
below, these effects can occur either when the relevant trade or investment
rule has been given domestic legal effect, or when the rule, or its enforcement through international dispute settlement procedures, generates sufficient political pressure on policymakers to induce them to modify the
domestic measure. Significantly, these effects can also include interference
with international efforts to collaborate on climate policy.

a. The Domestic Legal Status of International Trade and
Investment Rules
The assertion that trade and investment rules cannot modify domestic
law appears to be based on an inaccurate assumption that these rules lack
domestic legal effect. The domestic status of international law is usually
discussed in the context of the distinction between the “monist” approach,
which treats international law as part of the same legal system as domestic
law, and the “dualist” approach, which treats it as a distinct legal system.114
The United States approach to international law in general—and international trade law in particular—contains elements of both monism and
dualism.
The implementing legislation for U.S. trade agreements typically provides that federal law may not be challenged in federal court on the grounds
that it is inconsistent with a provision of a trade agreement.115 In contrast,
the federal government may seek judgments in federal court declaring that
restitution of property, in which case the award shall provide that the respondent may pay
monetary damages and any applicable interest in lieu of restitution.”).
113.
At least this is the case under U.S. investment treaties, although there is support
for the position that there is no inherent limit on the award of “non-pecuniary remedies” in
ISDS proceedings. See generally Christoph Schreuer, Non-Pecuniary Remedies in ICSID Arbitration, 20 ARB. INT’L 325 (2004). And even under current U.S. practice, an investment tribunal may order “an interim measure of protection to preserve the rights of a disputing party,
or to ensure that the tribunal’s jurisdiction is made fully effective, including an order to
preserve evidence in the possession or control of a disputing party or to protect the tribunal’s
jurisdiction.” 2012 MODEL U.S. BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 112, art. 28(8).
114.
See generally John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Political Systems: A Policy Analysis,
86 AM . J. INT’L L. 310, 313-15 (1992).
115.
See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 3312(A)(1) (2012) (“No provision of [NAFTA], nor the application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, which is inconsistent with any
law of the United States shall have effect”).
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state or local laws—including climate measures—are preempted by a trade or
investment rule.116
Current U.S. practice with regard to bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) is to ratify them as self-executing treaties—meaning that they can be
directly enforced in federal courts against either state law or prior federal
legislation.117 Accordingly, both federal and state climate measures are subject to domestic legal challenges under U.S. BITs.

b. The Political and Signaling Effects of Trade and
Investment Rules on Climate Policy
In addition to direct legal effects, international trade and investment
rules can also exert political pressure that could affect climate policies. This
pressure could come in various forms, starting with the broad normative
force of international law on policymakers.
As Louis Henkin famously observed, “almost all nations observe almost
all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost
all of the time.”118 The general “compliance pull” of international law is
widely accepted.119 Even treaties that lack adjudication or enforcement
mechanisms can induce government compliance by, inter alia, generating a
sense of legal obligation, creating reputational risk for noncompliance, and
mobilizing domestic constituencies.120
116.
See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 3312(B)(2) (2012) (emphasis added) (“No State law, or the
application thereof, may be declared invalid as to any person or circumstance on the ground
that the provision or application is inconsistent with [NAFTA], except in an action brought by
the United States for the purpose of declaring such law or application invalid.”).
117.
See 157 Cong. Rec. S5339 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 2011) (Resolution of Advice and Consent for the Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2011-09-06/pdf/CREC2011-09-06-pt1-PgS5339.pdf (declaring that the “Articles [providing substantive rights to
foreign investors] and other provisions that qualify or create exceptions to these Articles are
self-executing.”).
118.
L OUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979).
119.
See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF L EGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 3 (1990) (“In the
international system, rules usually are not enforced yet they are mostly obeyed. Lacking
support from a coercive power comparable to that which provides backing for the laws of a
nation, the rules of the international community nevertheless elicit much compliance on the
part of sovereign states.”); see also ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008) (arguing that states are motivated to comply with their international commitments by concerns about reciprocal non-compliance, retaliation, and reputation even absent coercive enforcement).
120.
Daniel Bodansky, Legally Binding Versus Non-Legally Binding Instruments, in TOWARDS
A WORKABLE AND EFFECTIVE CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME 155, 161 (Scott Barrett et al. eds., 2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2649630.
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International climate policy in particular is predicated on the ability of
instruments like the Paris Agreement to affect domestic policy even in the
absence of direct domestic legal effect. International rules can provide a
framework for countries to overcome the collective action problem
presented by climate change, given that there is little incentive for any
country to adopt mitigation measures without some assurance of similar
efforts by others.121 Accordingly, the debate over the extent to which the
provisions of international trade and investment agreements can “chill” domestic policy—including climate policy—seems strangely detached from
more general assumptions about the normative force of international law.
Moreover, compared with other areas of international law, trade and
investment rules are enforceable through relatively robust international dispute settlement procedures and remedial mechanisms. The system of “suspension of concessions” for violations of trade rules is intended to exert
economic and political pressure on the targeted countries in order to persuade them to modify or repeal the offending measures.122 The potential
for multi-million dollar awards can similarly induce governments to modify
measures that are targeted in investment disputes, even before there has
been any finding of liability.123
121.
See Charlotte Streck et al., The Paris Agreement: A New Beginning, 13 J. EUR. ENVTL.
& PLAN. L. 3, 27-28 (2016) (emphasis added) (“Climate change represents a collective action
problem par excellence. The effects of GHG emissions . . . are globally distributed, whereas
the costs of reducing emissions . . . are concentrated. Although maximum benefit would be
derived from all countries reducing GHG emissions to the full extent of their capabilities, an
individual country risks taking on the cost without deriving the benefit where other major
emitters do not reciprocate, or choose to freeride. With GHG emissions still inextricably
linked to key economic sectors, often in global competition, few countries are willing to take
this risk. The purpose of an international treaty is, in part, to create mutual confidence in reciprocity,
diminish the risk of free-riders and overcome the collective action problem through enhanced
coordination.”).
122.
See DSU, supra note 111, art. 22.1 (“[N]either compensation nor the suspension of
concessions or other obligations is preferred to full implementation of a recommendation to
bring a measure into conformity with the covered agreements”); see also John H. Jackson,
International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: Obligation to Comply or Option to
“Buy Out”?, 98 AM . J. INT’L L. 109, 123 (2004) (“[T]he result of a WTO dispute in a panel or
(sometimes) appellate report that rules that the laws or other measures of a respondent
nation are inconsistent with its WTO obligations is to create an international law obligation
to comply with that report . . .”). International trade law in particular is often pointed to as
an example of the capacity of international law to influence state behavior. PANAGIOTIS DELIMATSIS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES AND DOMESTIC REGULATIONS: NECESSITY, TRANSPARENCY,
AND REGULATORY DIVERSITY 5 (2007) (suggesting that the WTO’s dispute settlement procedures “arguably constitute the strongest dispute settlement mechanism in the history of international law.”).
123.
Uruguay, for example, almost amended its cigarette packaging laws in response to
an investment claim brought by Philip Morris in 2010. See Robert Stumberg, Safeguards for
Tobacco Control: Options for the TPPA, 39 AM . J.L. & MED. 382, 395-97 (2013); Bernardo M.
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Although the United States has not yet lost any ISDS proceedings,
there are numerous examples of the United States modifying both administrative and legislative standards in response to adverse WTO decisions.
Federal law is not subject to domestic legal challenges based on inconsistency with trade rules,124 but the federal government may exercise existing
authority to modify federal regulations in response to a trade dispute.125
The government has exercised this authority in a number of cases, including
the longstanding dispute with Mexico over the standards for labeling tuna
as “dolphin safe.”126 Congress also can modify legislative standards in response to trade or investment disputes, as demonstrated by its exclusion of
beef and pork from statutory country of origin labeling (COOL) requirements that the WTO’s Appellate Body concluded violated certain WTO
obligations.127
Not only can trade and investment rules be used in a similar manner to
create political and economic pressure to modify climate policies of individCremades, Jr., Third Party Litigation Funding: Investing in Arbitration, 8 TRANSNAT’L DISP .
MGMT. 18 (2011), http://www.curtis.com/siteFiles/Publications/TDM.pdf. The claim was
eventually rejected on the merits in July of 2016. Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Oriental Republic of Uruguay, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7 45-46 (July 8, 2016), http://www.ita
law.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7417.pdf.
124.
See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 3312 (A)(1) (2012); supra note 115 and accompanying text.
125.
See, e.g., H.R. REP . NO. 103-316 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040,
4050, 1994 WL 16137731 (“Section 102(a)(1) [of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act] clarifies that no provision of a Uruguay Round agreement will be given effect under domestic law
if it is inconsistent with federal law, including provisions of federal law enacted or amended
by the bill. Section 102(a)(1) will not prevent implementation of federal statutes consistently with
the Uruguay Round agreements, where permissible under the terms of such statutes. Rather, the
section reflects the Congressional view that necessary changes in federal statutes should be
specifically enacted rather than provided for in a blanket preemption of federal statutes by
those agreements.”).
126.
See Enhanced Document Requirements and Captain Training Requirements To
Support Use of the Dolphin Safe Label on Tuna Products, 81 Fed. Reg. 15444, 15445 (Mar.
23, 2016), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-03-23/pdf/2016-06450.pdf (noting that
the United States has repeatedly modified its regulations governing the labeling of tuna as
“dolphin safe” in response to rulings by the WTO’s Appellate Body that the regulations
violated provisions of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).
127.
See Removal of Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling Requirements for Beef and
Pork Muscle Cuts, Ground Beef, and Ground Pork, 81 Fed. Reg. 10755 (Mar. 2, 2016) (“The
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 amended the [Agricultural Marketing Acct of 1946]
to remove muscle cut beef and pork, and ground beef and pork from COOL requirements in
order to bring the United States into compliance with its international trade obligations.”).
Congress acted after the WTO’s Appellate Body rejected the United States attempt to bring
the COOL program into compliance through administrative actions. See generally United
States - Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements Recourse to Article 21.5 of the
DSU by Canada and Mexico, WT/DS384, 386/AB/RW (May 18, 2015).
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ual countries, they can also potentially interfere with efforts to promote
coordinated international action on climate change. For example, in its decision rejecting the Keystone XL Pipeline the Obama administration noted
that
a decision to approve this proposed Project would undermine U.S.
objectives on climate change; it could call into question internationally the broader efforts of the United States to transition to lesspolluting forms of energy and would raise doubts about the U.S.
resolve to do so. In turn, this could raise questions for some countries about how aggressively they should combat climate change domestically, and potentially reduce the United States’ ability to
advance climate and broader objectives with allies and other partners in various bilateral and multilateral contexts.128
The Trump Administration’s subsequent approval of the pipeline, in
conjunction with TransCanada’s withdrawal of its ISDS claim,129 undermined the United States’ capacity to coordinate with other countries on
climate change. Trade and investment challenges to other climate measures
could similarly reduce the effectiveness of international efforts like the Paris
Agreement to signal to investors and the energy sector that governments are
moving toward policies that will reward the development and deployment
of clean energy.130
128.
See U.S. DEP ’T OF STATE, RECORD OF DECISION AND NATIONAL INTEREST DETERMINATION
TRANSCANADA KEYSTONE PIPELINE, L.P. APPLICATION FOR PRESIDENTIAL PERMIT 6.3 (2015).
129.
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
130.
See Remarks at the First Session of the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Le Bourget, France, 2015 DAILY CO M P . PRES. DOC. 847 (Nov. 30, 2015), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/30/remarks-president-obama-first-session-cop21 (“If
we put the right rules and incentives in place, we’ll unleash the creative power of our best
scientists and engineers and entrepreneurs to deploy clean energy technologies and the new
jobs and new opportunities that they create all around the world. There are hundreds of
billions of dollars ready to deploy to countries around the world if they get the signal that we
mean business this time. Let’s send that signal.”); see also Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon,
UN, Remarks at meeting of at UN Global Compact Caring for Climate Business Forum, UN NEWS
CENTER, Dec. 8, 2015, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2015-12-08/remarksmeeting-un-global-compact-caring-climate-business-forum (“Across the world, businesses
and investors are standing up for a strong agreement in Paris that sends the right market
signals. They are asking for a clear message that the transition to cleaner, low emissions
energy sources is necessary, inevitable, irreversible and beneficial.”); Press Release, Office of
the Press Secretary, U.S. Leadership and the Historic Paris Agreement to Combat Climate
Change (Dec. 12, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/12/12/us-leadership-and-historic-paris-agreement-combat-climate-change (The Paris Agreement “Provid[es]
a strong, long-term market signal that the world is locking in a low-carbon future . . . . This
will make it far easier to draw in the largest pools of capital that need long-term certainty in
order to invest in clean technologies.”).
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IV. MITIGATION ANALYSIS
Executive Order 13141 states that the environmental review process, in
addition to identifying potential environmental effects of trade agreements,
is also intended to “help facilitate consideration of appropriate responses to
those effects whether in the course of negotiation, through other means, or
both.”131 The Environmental Review Guidelines similarly indicate that
“[w]here significant regulatory and/or economically driven environmental
impacts have been identified, there shall be an analysis of options to mitigate negative impacts. . . .”132
Analysis of options to mitigate economically driven climate impacts
should focus on potential approaches to offsetting projected increases in
GHG emissions to ensure that the proposed agreement is, at a minimum,
carbon neutral. Analysis of options for mitigating regulatory impacts
should focus on identifying alternative provisions for the agreement that
would preserve the ability of governments to implement climate mitigation
measures.

A. Mitigation of Economically Driven Increases in
GHG Emissions
A variety of potential approaches to mitigating projected economically
driven increases in GHG emissions deserve consideration. If the analysis
indicates that the increases would result from changes to trade flows with
regard to certain products due to tariff reductions, the potential to avoid
those increased emissions by maintaining higher tariff bindings on those
products should be assessed.
An alternative strategy being pursued in the negotiations on the Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) involves reducing tariffs on designated
“environmental goods.”133 In theory, this approach could be used to mitigate the increased emissions that would result from tariff reductions on
other products. The climate benefits of the EGA, however, could be limited given the relatively low levels of tariffs that many of the countries
involved in the negotiations already apply.134 Moreover, critics have
131.
Exec. Order No. 13,141, 64 FR 63169 § 2 (Nov. 18, 1999); see also ENVIRONMENTAL
REVIEW GUIDELINES, supra note 10, § V(D)(2) (emphasis added) (“[A]nalysis of options to
mitigate negative impacts . . . may include changes to negotiating positions as well as environmental policy responses outside the trade agreement . . .”).
132.
ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW GUIDELINES, supra note 10, § V(D)(2).
133.
See USTR, ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS AGREEMENT, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/
other-initiatives/environmental-goods-agreement (last visited June 11, 2017).
134.
Rene Vossenaar, Securing Climate Benefits in the Environmental Goods Agreement, BIORES, Dec. 2014, at 4, 7, http://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/review/biores8-10_0.pdf
(“[W]hile a tariff cutting EGA is certainly a welcome step forward, the impact on tariff

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\7-1\MEA102.txt

Fall 2017]

unknown

Seq: 29

Assessing the Climate Impacts of U.S. Trade Agreements

16-MAR-18

7:21

79

claimed that the lack of a clear definition of covered “environmental goods”
could result in liberalization in the trade of products that exacerbate climate
change.135 Accordingly, assessments in environmental reviews of the potential to mitigate increases in GHG emissions by reducing tariffs on “environmental goods” should include quantitative analysis demonstrating the
projected climate benefits of liberalization with regard to specific products.
A potentially more promising approach to mitigating increased GHG
emissions that merits consideration would be to include restrictions on fossil fuel subsidies in trade agreements. Globally, fossil fuel subsidies exceed
$500 billion annually and increase GHG emissions by encouraging the production and consumption of fossil fuels.136 The International Monetary
Fund has estimated that elimination of fossil fuel subsidies would result in a
13% reduction of energy-related CO2 emissions (as well as significant reductions in other air pollutants).137 Restrictions on fossil fuel subsidies in bilateral or regional trade agreement could serve as catalysts for the broader
global restrictions that would be needed to achieve these reductions, which
would more than offset projected economically induced increases in GHG
from trade liberalization. More immediately, limits on fossil subsidies in
trade agreements could help countries achieve the INDCs that they committed to under the Paris Agreement.138

levels in environmental goods is likely to be relatively small given that MFN-applied tariffs
in most EGA participant countries are already low . . .”).
135.
TRANSP. & ENV’T, ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS AGREEMENT 3 (Sept. 2015), https://www.
transportenvironment.org/sites/te/files/publications/2015%2009%20TE_EGA%20briefing%
20note_FINAL.PDF (“We believe that a robust assessment methodology would ensure that
biofuels generically be excluded [from the EGA] as they are often worse than fossil fuels
from a climate perspective . . . . Likewise the inclusion of aviation engines, with aviation
being the most energy and climate intensive mode of transport, does not support the transition to an energy efficient . . . transport system.”).
136.
See Int’l Energy Agency, supra note 95, at 90.
137.
IMF, Energy Subsidy Reform: Lessons and Implications 18 (Jan. 2013), http://www.
imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/012813.pdf (eliminating fossil fuel subsidies “would reduce
CO2 emissions by 41/2 billion tons, representing a 13 percent decrease in global energy-related CO2 emissions. Eliminating subsidies would also generate significant health benefits by
. . . result[ing] in a reduction of 10 million tons in SO2 emissions and a 13 percent reduction
in other local pollutants.”).
138.
See generally Laura Merrill et al., Fossil-Fuel Subsidies and Climate Change Options for
policy-makers within their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (GSI & IISD, Working
Paper NA2015:905, 2015), http://www.iisd.org/gsi/sites/default/files/FFS_Climate.pdf; see
also Shelagh Whitley & Laurie van der Burg, Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform: From Rhetoric to
Reality (Glob. Comm’n on the Economy and Climate, Working Paper, 2015), http://2015.new
climateeconomy.report/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Fossil-fuel-subsidy-reform_from-rhetor
ic-to-reality.pdf.
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B. Mitigation of Impacts on Climate Regulations
A variety of approaches to mitigating the effects of proposed trade
agreements on climate policies could also be assessed in environmental reviews. For example, provisions could be included in proposed trade agreements that would protect renewable energy programs, BTAs for carbon
pricing mechanisms, and other climate mitigation measures from challenge
under trade and investment rules.139 The protections could take a variety of
forms, including “carve outs” of climate measures from part or all of proposed trade agreements,140 “peace clauses” prohibiting challenges to climate
measures for a specified period of time,141 or safeguards modeled on the
“green light” provisions of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (SCM Agreement).142 Alternatively, the United States could negotiate separate agreements with its trading partners that would preclude
the use of trade agreements to challenge climate measures.143
The mitigation analysis should consider the extent to which these safeguards, if applied to all trade and investment agreements in force between
the Parties,144 could not only mitigate potential adverse climate impacts but
139.
See supra Section III(B)(1).
140.
Gus Van Harten, An ISDS Carve-Out to Support Action on Climate Change 1-2 (Osgoode Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 38, 2015) (proposing language to be included in a
multilateral climate agreement that would exclude climate measures from ISDS challenges).
141.
Peace clause provisions could be modeled on Article 13 of the WTO’s Agreement
on Agriculture, which provided agricultural subsidies with temporary protection from trade
challenges. See Agreement on Agriculture art. 13, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410, https://
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag_01_e.htm. The Agreement on Agriculture’s
peace clause expired at the end of 2003. See id. at art. 1(f).
142.
Under the “green light” provisions of the SCM Agreement certain subsidies, including “assistance to promote adaptation of existing facilities to new environmental requirements,” were exempt from dispute settlement proceedings until the expiration of the
provisions in 2000. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 8.2(c), Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867
U.N.T.S. 410; see also id. at art. 31. Broader provisions—with or without a time limitation—
could be used to protect climate measures from trade challenges.
143.
The analysis of options to mitigate adverse environmental impacts may include
actions external to the trade agreement being negotiated. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
144.
There are potential legal obstacles to using a provision in a bilateral or regional
agreement to block WTO challenges to climate policies. A 2015 decision by the WTO’s
Appellate Body raises questions about the extent to which states may use bilateral or regional
agreements to limit use of the WTO’s dispute settlement procedures with regard to climate
measures. In Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, the Appellate
Body rejected the argument made by Peru that a provision in its free trade agreement with
Guatemala precluded Guatemala from challenging Peru’s imposition of an additional duty on
certain agricultural products. Appellate Body Report, Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of
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also result in an agreement with positive effects for climate policy. This
would be consistent with the mandate under Executive Order 13141 to
“identify potential environmental effects of trade agreements, both positive
and negative.”145

V. CONCLUSION
The trade and climate policies of the United States are inextricably
interconnected. Trade liberalization tends to increase net GHG emissions,
and trade and investment rules can undermine climate policies. These linkages, however, are largely unacknowledged and accordingly have not played
a role in the development of U.S. trade policy. The United States could
begin to work toward promoting coherence between its trade policy and
climate goals by including consideration of both the economically driven
and regulatory impacts of proposed trade agreements in environmental reviews conducted pursuant to Executive Order 13141. Careful assessment of
the effects of trade policies on climate change could provide policymakers
with guidance on options for avoiding adverse impacts and potentially identify mitigation strategies—such as including restrictions on fossil fuel subsidies in trade agreements—that would advance both trade and climate
objectives.

Certain Agricultural Products, 59-61, WTO Doc. WT/DS457/AB/R (July 20, 2015). The implications of Peru–Additional Duty are not clear, however, given that the provision at issue did
not explicitly refer to WTO obligations. The Appellate Body recognized that a waiver of
rights to pursue WTO remedies is permitted as part of a mutually agreed solution to a
dispute and stated further that “we do not exclude the possibility of articulating the relinquishment of the right to initiate WTO dispute settlement proceedings in a form other than
a waiver embodied in a mutually agreed solution . . . [although] any such relinquishment
must be made clearly.” Id. ¶ 5.25. Moreover, regardless of whether it would be recognized
by the Appellate Body, an agreement between two or more WTO Members not to bring
trade challenges against climate measures could serve as an important political and diplomatic constraint on such claims. It should also be noted that “WTO-plus” restrictions on
fossil fuel subsidies would be unlikely to raise any issues of WTO-consistency.
145.
Exec. Order No. 13,141, § 2 (Nov. 18, 1999) (emphasis added). See also ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW GUIDELINES, supra note 10, § IV(B)(3)(c)(1) (“Scoping shall be used to assist
in identifying possible alternative negotiating approaches and options for accomplishing the
broad objectives of the trade agreement, including approaches for achieving environmental
benefits.”).
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